Why Penang Fell to the Opposition

This article was originally published in The Edge Financial Daily on March 10, 2008

During the 2004 election, as a journalist, I chose to cover Kinta Valley because it was by and by far the most interesting hotspot around. DAP's Lim Kit Siang had made Perak a frontline state and the competition was bound to be fierce.

This time around, there were several hotspots but Penang was the hottest of the hotspots. Both DAP and Keadilan had decided Penang would be their frontline state. So, although I was no longer a journalist, I had to be there. I took leave to cover the last three days leading to polling day.

I had heard from several political observers that Penang was hot. But how hot is hot? Keadilan was talking about forming the state government but DAP spoke in more modest terms, aiming merely to deny the Barisan Nasional a two-thirds majority in the state. I figured DAP's aims were more realistic.

I spoke to one election expert who told me that it was impossible for the opposition to take the state and it was highly unlikely that they could deny the BN its two-thirds majority there. He based it on past voting patterns, his understanding of how the constituencies had been delineated and the perceived degree of swing votes. It sounded very scientific and convincing.

Both he and I were familiar with the "Tipping Point" – a concept made famous by author Malcolm Gladwell which describes a moment of critical mass that makes the momentum for change unstoppable. "Isn't it possible that somehow a tipping point situation is happening in Penang?" I asked. He replied that it's possible but pegged it at 1%.

Something told me he could be wrong. That something was not in the form of statistics or surveys or sophisticated analysis but the comments of everyday people in Penang. I discounted the views of people at opposition rallies because I figured they were the "converted". Of course they'd say they want change.

What surprised me was how the man-in-the-street, including those who did not attend opposition rallies and weren't readers of Malaysiakini, still pretty much said the same thing. "It's time for a change."

This was anecdotal evidence and not scientific at all, but something told me that the opposition might just have a chance at winning the state. In retrospect, my gut instincts were right. The people of Penang were indeed ready for a change. But I don't think anyone – not even Anwar Ibrahim – could have, in their wildest dreams, imagined that the opposition would control two-thirds of the state seats.

Political analyst Khoo Kay Peng says there are three key reasons why the BN was defeated in Penang.

Firstly, basic economics: Bread and butter issues do matter. "Toll hikes, oil price hikes, inflation – all these things affect the common folk, and it's the common folks who vote you in or out of office," says Khoo.

Secondly, the failure to deliver on promises: When Pak Lah won his huge mandate in 2004, he promised to increase accountability and stamp out corruption. "The public sector is still cumbersome, the judiciary is facing a scandal, the police force has not been reformed – people don't see any improvements in these areas," says Khoo.

Thirdly, UMNO's political hegemony: People have not forgotten the keris waving and alarming rhetoric that emerged from the UMNO general assemblies in recent years. "Many Penangites felt the non-Malay component party leaders did not play their role well and kowtowed too much to UMNO," says Khoo.

It's hard to say which of these factors played the biggest role. When I spoke to people, their grouses typically centred around these three core issues. The third issue resonated in particular with the non-Malay voters. However, Penang could not have been won without a big swing in Malay votes as well.

The Malay voters swung too despite the fact that Anwar had publicly called for the NEP to be abolished in favor of a new policy that helps the needy regardless of race. The former deputy prime minister hammered home the point that the NEP not only marginalized the non-Malays but that it marginalized most Malays too, benefiting only a handful of cronies.

"For the first time, the people of Penang – Chinese, Indians and Malays – all had a common reference point," says Khoo. "They were against BN's political culture which was dominated and dictated by UMNO."

By holding the elections in March instead of April, the BN denied Anwar a chance to contest. Conventional wisdom tells you that this would demoralize the opposition because it took their de facto leader out of action. But that's only true with regards to him as a candidate. He could still campaign even if he couldn't contest.

In fact, by taking him out of play, he was then free to move around and help opposition candidates from all three parties, DAP, PAS and of course, Keadilan. And that's exactly what he did, giving opposition candidates across Penang a boost wherever he spoke. And he spoke everywhere.

Like DAP's Lim Guan Eng, Anwar crisscrossed the state – on the island and on the mainland – to give multiple ceramahs every day during the official campaign period. It was a grueling schedule they maintained, but in the end, the strategy paid off handsomely.